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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Terence Pak Sing Tsui appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. The district court erred in concluding that a probation and parole officer had
reason to believe that Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous when the officer
encountered him during a residence check of a third party under felony supervision, and
Mr. Tsui appeared nervous and denied having weapons. The officer’s frisk of Mr. Tsui
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the evidence that was discovered as a result of that frisk should have been suppressed.
This Court should vacate Mr. Tsui’s conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on March 18, 2015, two uniformed probation and
parole officers armed with firearms, masks and handcuffs, conducted a residence check
of Robert Dixon,1 who was under felony supervision. (11/5/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-21; p.9,
Ls.10-15; p.20, Ls.7-13; p.30, Ls.7-17.) When they arrived at Mr. Dixon’s residence, the
officers observed a vehicle “out in front” with a male in the driver’s seat.

(11/5/15

Tr., p.19, L.25 – p.20, L.3.) Officer Martinez asked the driver if he was at Mr. Dixon’s
house and he said, “No, I’m waiting for a friend,” and indicated he was waiting for
someone across the street. (11/5/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-6.)

In the transcript, Robert Dixon’s last name is spelled “Dickson.” This appears to be a
mistake, as his last name is spelled “Dixon” in written submissions. (See, e.g.,
R., pp.43, 51.)

1

1

The officers knocked on the door of Mr. Dixon’s residence, and a woman let them
in. (11/5/15 Tr., p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.3.) Mr. Dixon came downstairs, followed shortly
thereafter by Mr. Tsui. (11/5/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.18-20.) Officer Martinez asked Mr. Tsui if
he had weapons on him and he said, “No.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-24.) Officer
Martinez testified at the suppression hearing that when Mr. Tsui got to the bottom of the
stairs, “he was nervous, didn’t make much eye contact, [and] kept scanning the room . .
. .” (11/5/15 Tr., p.22, Ls.10-15.) Officer Martinez told him, “I need to search you for
weapons.”

(11/5/15 Tr., p.23, L.19 – p.24, L.5.)

Officer Martinez testified that he

decided to frisk Mr. Tsui because of Mr. Tsui’s “nervousness” and because he has “run
into situations where people lie to us” and “wanted to make sure that he did not have . .
. any weapons on him.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.9-13, 22-25.) Mr. Tsui seemed nervous
but “complied” with the search. (11/5/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.6-13.)
As Officer Martinez was patting down Mr. Tsui and “searching his torso,” he
“could smell marijuana pretty strong” and “then . . . felt a pretty significant bulge in . . .
his pant pocket.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.25, Ls.18-22.) Officer Martinez asked Mr. Tsui if he
had marijuana on him and Mr. Tsui answered, “Yes.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26,
L.1.) At that point, Mr. Tsui retrieved a bag of marijuana from his pocket. (11/5/15
Tr., p.26, Ls.2-7.)

The probation and parole officers contacted the Boise Police

Department, who responded to the scene and arrested Mr. Tsui. (11/5/15 Tr., p.13,
Ls.7-19.) Methamphetamine was found on Mr. Tsui’s person during a search incident to
his arrest. (11/5/15 Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14; p.31, Ls.15-20.)
Mr. Tsui was charged by Information with felony possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance
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(marijuana), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.22-23.)

Mr. Tsui filed a motion to suppress and the State filed an objection. (R., pp.41-45, 5157.) The district court held a hearing on Mr. Tsui’s motion, and denied the motion for
reasons it explained on the record.

(R., pp.66-67; 11/5/15 Tr., p.35, Ls.7-9.) The

district court concluded the frisk was not unlawful. It explained:
[U]nder the circumstances within which the officers entered the residence,
under the way that [Mr. Tsui] presented to the officers and after the
parolee came downstairs, I do find that there was reason to believe or to
suspect that Mr. Tsui may have been armed and then a pat search was
reasonable under those circumstances.
(11/5/15 Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.34, L.2.) The district court also concluded the marijuana
was not discovered as a result of the frisk, but as a result of Officer Martinez’s detection
of an odor of marijuana. (11/5/15 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-16.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Tsui entered into an
agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to felony
possession of a controlled substance and, in exchange, the parties agreed to
recommend a suspended sentence and screening for drug court. (11/12/15 Tr., p.8,
Ls.2-10; p.9, L.13 – p.10, L.4; R., pp.69-76.) Mr. Tsui reserved his right to appeal from
the denial of his motion to suppress. (11/12/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-12; R., p.77.) The district
court accepted Mr. Tsui’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a unified term of five years,
with one year fixed. (11/12/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.19-24; 12/10/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-18.) The
district court suspended the sentence, placed Mr. Tsui on supervised probation for a
period of five years, and accepted him into drug court. (12/10/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-20; p.6,
Ls.2-3, 10-11, 18-20.) The judgment was entered on December 14, 2015. (R., pp.8892.) Mr. Tsui filed a timely notice of appeal on December 28, 2015. (R., pp.101-03.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tsui’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tsui’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Officer Martinez frisked Mr. Tsui even though, at the moment of the frisk, a

reasonably prudent person in the officer’s position would not have been justified in
concluding that Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous. The frisk thus violated
Mr. Tsui’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Contrary to
the district court’s conclusion, the marijuana and methamphetamine were discovered on
Mr. Tsui as a result of the illegal frisk and must be excluded. The district court erred in
denying Mr. Tsui’s motion to suppress and this Court should vacate Mr. Tsui’s
conviction, reverse the order denying Mr. Tsui’s motion to suppress, and remand this
case to the district court for further proceedings.
B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress

evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207
(2009) (citation omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous.

However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s

application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).
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C.

Officer Martinez’s Frisk Of Mr. Tsui Violated His Fourth Amendment Right To Be
Free From Unreasonable Searches Because, At The Moment Of The Frisk,
Officer Martinez Did Not Have Reason To Believe That Mr. Tsui Was Armed And
Presently Dangerous
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

In order to be reasonable, a search must be

authorized by a warrant based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818 (2009). One exception
to the warrant requirement is a patdown for weapons, as recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). See id. Under Terry, an
officer may conduct a limited patdown for weapons, referred to as a frisk, if “at the
moment of the frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is
investigating is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others and nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer’s belief.” State v. Crooks, 150
Idaho 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2010). “The purpose of this exception is to enable an officer to
continue the contact with the individual without fear of violence.” State v. Davenport,
144 Idaho 99, 101 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted).
Whether a frisk is reasonable is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. See State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 292 (Ct. App. 2001). “The
test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a
risk of danger.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818 (citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard,
the officer must indicate specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, in light of his or her experience, justify the officer’s
suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 818-19 (quotation marks
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and citations omitted). “Although an officer need not possess absolutely certainty than
an individual is armed and dangerous, an officer’s inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch is not enough to justify a frisk.” Id. at 819 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The district court concluded that “under the circumstances within which the
officers entered the residence, under the way that [Mr. Tsui] presented to the officers
and after the parolee came downstairs, I do find that there was reason to believe or to
suspect that Mr. Tsui may have been armed . . . .” (11/5/15 Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.34, L.2.)
The district court erred. As an initial matter, it is not clear what “circumstances” the
district court is referring to with respect to the officers’ entry into Mr. Dixon’s residence.
The officers were conducting a residence check of Mr. Dixon, who was on felony
probation. There is no evidence in the record regarding Mr. Dixon’s criminal history.
There is also no evidence in the record that Mr. Dixon’s residence was or had been a
place of known criminal activity.

It is also unclear why “they way that [Mr. Tsui]

presented to the officers” would arouse any suspicion that he was armed and presently
dangerous.

Mr. Tsui walked downstairs after Mr. Dixon, and denied having any

weapons on him. (11/5/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-24.) There is no indication that he had a
bulge in his pocket that resembled a weapon, made any threatening or furtive
movements, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or was unwilling to
cooperate with the officers in any way. These are factors that can be considered under
the totality of the circumstances, see Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, but they are not present
here.
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Officer Martinez testified that he believed Mr. Tsui was armed and presently
dangerous because he was nervous and because, though he denied having weapons,
people often lie about that. The prosecutor asked Officer Martinez if there was anything
about Mr. Tsui’s demeanor that gave rise to any concerns. (11/5/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.6-8.)
Officer Martinez answered, “Yeah, just the nervousness. He didn’t want to really face
me.

He just kind of turned and was looking away, trying to look away from me.”

(11/5/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.9-12.) The prosecutor later asked, “Is there anything about your
interaction with Mr. Tsui that based upon your training and experience gave you any
concern for your personal safety?”

(11/5/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-21.)

Officer Martinez

answered, “Yeah, these—I mean, I’ve ran into situations where people lie to us. So I
wanted to make sure that he did not have any fire—or any weapons on him.” (11/5/15
Tr., p.24, Ls.22-25.) That fact that Mr. Tsui was nervous and that people may lie about
not having weapons would not justify a reasonably prudent person in concluding that
Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous.
It is clear from our Supreme Court’s case law that an individual’s nervousness
cannot justify a frisk. In State v. Henage, a police officer conducted a frisk of the
passenger of a vehicle that had been pulled over for a broken taillight. 143 Idaho 655,
657-58 (2007). The officer decided to conduct the frisk after observing the passenger’s
nervous behavior and learning the passenger had a knife. Id. at 658.

The Court

reversed the district court and held that the frisk was unlawful. Id. at 662-63. The Court
reasoned that the passenger’s nervous appearance did not justify the conclusion that he
was armed and presently dangerous because the officer “did not connect [the
passenger’s] nervousness with anything tending to demonstrate a risk to his safety.” Id.
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at 662-62. And the passenger’s admission that he had a knife did not justify the frisk
because the fact that someone possesses a weapon does not necessarily mean that
the person poses a risk of danger. Id. at 662. In fact, the circumstances indicated that
the passenger was not dangerous because he did not act threatening, did not have a
reputation for violence, did not make any furtive movements, and was cooperative and
polite. Id. at 661-62.
It is likewise clear from our Supreme Court’s case law that the fact that people
may lie about not having weapons cannot justify a frisk, even when combined with
nervousness. In State v. Bishop, the officer who frisked the defendant testified that he
conducted the frisk for officer safety, but did not identify any objective facts supporting
his conclusion that his safety was in danger. 146 Idaho at 819. The Idaho Supreme
Court reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress,
explaining “there was evidence that [the defendant] was acting nervous and may have
been under the influence of a narcotic, [but] those facts alone are not enough to justify
the frisk.” Id. at 820. The Court noted that the officer did not testify that the defendant
“behaved in an aggressive or threatening manner or that, based on his experience,
suspects under the influence of narcotics tend to resort to violence.” Id. The Court also
noted that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] ‘could possibly’ be carrying a weapon does not
distinguish him from any other individual the police encounter” because Idaho law
authorizes individuals to carry concealed weapons with a permit. Id. at 820, n.13. The
Court recognized that “[i]f an officer’s bare assertion that a suspect ‘could possibly’ be
carrying a weapon was enough to establish that a person posed a risk of danger,
officers could frisk any person with whom they come into contact.” Id.
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Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person in Officer
Martinez’s position would not have been justified in concluding that Mr. Tsui presented a
risk of danger.

The facts articulated by Officer Martinez—specifically, Mr. Tsui’s

nervousness and the fact that he denied having weapons—taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, cannot justify Officer Martinez’s subjective
impression that Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others at
the moment of the frisk. Because Officer Martinez did not have reason to believe that
Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous at the moment of the frisk, the frisk
violated Mr. Tsui’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
D.

The Marijuana And Methamphetamine Were Discovered As A Result Of The
Illegal Frisk And Must Be Excluded
Under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, all evidence acquired as a result

of an illegal frisk, including later-discovered evidence derived from the frisk, must be
excluded. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu,
152 Idaho 511, 518-19 (2012).

The district court concluded that the marijuana

contained in Mr. Tsui’s pocket, which Mr. Tsui gave to Officer Martinez after the illegal
frisk, was not acquired as a result of the frisk, but as a result of Officer Martinez’s
detection of an odor of marijuana. The district court explained:
The next issue is actually whether the discovery of the marijuana was from
the pat search. In this case I find that it was not. Officer Martinez actually
smelled the marijuana based on his training and experience. And under
[State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267 (Ct. App. 1992), and State v. Shepherd,
118 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 1990)], there’s no search where an officer lawfully
was positioned to smell marijuana. He smelled the marijuana, questioned
the defendant. The defendant consented and pulled the marijuana out of
his own pocket. It was not Officer Martinez going into Mr. Tsui’s pocket to
obtain the marijuana.
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(11/5/15 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-16.) The district court erred in concluding that the discovery of
the marijuana did not derive from the frisk. The marijuana that was located in Mr. Tsui’s
pocket, along with the methamphetamine discovered in the subsequent search of
Mr. Tsui’s person, should have been suppressed.
It is clear that Officer Martinez did not detect an odor of marijuana prior to frisking
Mr. Tsui.

At the suppression hearing, the following exchange took place between

counsel for Mr. Tsui and Officer Martinez:
Q.

And while you were pat-searching him, did you feel anything that
you suspected was marijuana?

A.

No. Actually I smelled marijuana and I asked him if he had any
marijuana on him and—

Q.

Slow down. So while you were pat-searching him, you smelled
marijuana; correct?

A.

Yeah. I actually also found something in his pocket. Didn’t know
what it was. I didn’t pull it out.

(11/5/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-14.) The prosecutor later asked Officer Martinez to “please
sequence it for us, the smell of the marijuana to the pat search and how that worked.”
(11/5/15 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-17.) Officer Martinez responded, “As I was pat searching his
torso and as I moved down his torso, I could smell marijuana pretty strong. And then I
felt a pretty significant bulge in his pocket, in his pant pocket.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.25, Ls.1822.)
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the State has the burden of establishing
that evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means without reference
to the unlawful search. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). The State did
not and cannot meet that burden here because there is no evidence that Officer
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Martinez would have detected an odor of marijuana if he had not been touching
Mr. Tsui’s torso while conducting an illegal frisk. Officer Martinez and Mr. Tsui were not
in an enclosed space, like a car, and would surely not have been in physical contact
absent the frisk.
In explaining its decision, the district court cited State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267,
but that case is inapposite.2 In Rigoulot, the Court of Appeals considered “whether the
district court erred when it found that the officers did not conduct a search when they
smelled marijuana at [a house where the defendant was living].” 123 Idaho at 271-72.
The Court concluded that the officers’ detection of marijuana did not constitute a search
because they were lawfully present in an area of the curtilage which would be occupied
by ordinary visitors when they detected an odor emanating from the private premises.
Id. at 272-73.
Rigoulot did not involve the application of the exclusionary rule—there was no
constitutional violation. Here, by contrast, there was a constitutional violation. Officer
Martinez’s frisk of Mr. Tsui was unreasonable, and violated Mr. Tsui’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment. The State did not meet its burden of showing that Officer Martinez
would have come into direct physical contact with Mr. Tsui absent the unlawful frisk.
Thus, the State did not meet its burden of showing that Officer Martinez’s detection of
The district court also cited State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 1990), but that
case is not on point. In Shepherd, the Court upheld the search of a backpack located in
the defendant’s car as a search incident to arrest, and upheld the search of a cooler
located in the trunk of the car under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, concluding there was probable cause for the search based on the
discovery of marijuana in the backpack. Id. at 121-24. The officer smelled marijuana as
he was approaching the defendant’s vehicle, id. at 121, but that was not material to the
Court’s decision.
2
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an odor of marijuana did not result from the frisk.

The marijuana discovered in

Mr. Tsui’s pocket, along with the methamphetamine discovered in the subsequent
search incident to his arrest, must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Tsui respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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